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Governing AI A Primer (Onur Bakiner)(Z-Library)

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Governing AI is about getting AI right. Building upon AI scholarship in science and technology studies, technology law, business ethics, and computer science, it documents potential risks and actual harms associated with AI, lists proposed solutions to AI-related problems around the world, and assesses their impact. The book presents a vast range of theoretical debates and empirical evidence to document how and how well technical solutions, business self-regulation, and legal regulation work. It is a call to think inside and outside the box. Technical solutions, business self-regulation, and especially legal regulation can mitigate and even eliminate some of the potential risks and actual harms arising from the development and use of AI. However, the long-term health of the relationship between technology and society depends on whether ordinary people are empowered to participate in making informed decisions to govern the future of technology – AI included. Conducts a comparative analysis of AI governance spanning multiple countries, multiple sectors, and multiple solution concepts Includes a comprehensive list of AI-specific and AI-related laws and bills around the world Empowers readers to make informed decisions about the future of AI

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Governing AI Governing AI is about getting AI right. Building upon AI scholarship in science and tech- nology studies, technology law, business ethics, and computer science, it documents potential risks and actual harms associated with AI, lists proposed solutions to AI-related problems around the world, and assesses their impact. This book presents a vast range of theoretical debates and empirical evidence to document how and how well tech- nical solutions, business self-regulation, and legal regulation work. It is a call to think inside and outside the box. Technical solutions, business self-regulation, and especially legal regulation can mitigate and even eliminate some of the potential risks and actual harms arising from the development and use of AI. However, the long-term health of the relationship between technology and society depends on whether ordinary people are empowered to participate in making informed decisions to govern the future of technol- ogy – AI included. Onur Bakiner is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Technology Ethics Initiative at Seattle University.
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Governing AI A Primer ONUR BAKINER Seattle University
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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009738309 DOI: 10.1017/9781009738347 © Onur Bakiner 2026 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. When citing this work, please include a reference to the DOI 10.1017/9781009738347 First published 2026 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-1-009-73830-9 Hardback ISBN 978-1-009-73833-0 Paperback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. For EU product safety concerns, contact us at Calle de José Abascal, 56, 1°, 28003 Madrid, Spain, or email eugpsr@cambridge.org
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v Acknowledgments page ix Introduction: Thinking Outside and Inside the Box to Govern AI 1 Data and Methods 5 Book Outline 6 1 What’s in an Abbreviation? Defining and Understanding AI 9 Defining Artificial Intelligence and Related Terminology 10 Artificial Intelligence 10 Machine Learning, Neural Networks, and Deep Learning 13 Large Language Models (LLMs) and Generative AI 14 Symbolic AI 16 Definitional Controversies 17 Rule-Based, Data-Driven, and Hybrid AI 17 AI and Human-Like Qualities 18 AI as Hype 19 Conclusion 20 2 The Quest for Good AI 22 Positive Adjectives Associated with AI 25 Ethical 25 Responsible 27 Safe 28 Trustworthy 29 Transparent and Explainable 30 Accurate 32 Just and Fair 32 Accountable 34 Sustainable 35 Robust 36 Contents
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vi Contents Accessible 36 Inclusive 37 “Good” AI Goals: Mutually Reinforcing or Mutually Exclusive? 38 Conclusion 39 3 When Things Go Wrong: Understanding AI Risks and Harms 41 The Potential Risks and Actual Harms Arising from the Use of AI Tools 43 Bias and Discrimination 43 Surveillance 47 Incorrect, Inaccurate, and Unreliable Output 48 Disinformation, Misinformation, or Manipulation 49 Harm to Life, Livelihood, and Well-Being 50 Privacy Violations 53 Decline in Product and Service Quality 54 Political Polarization, Online Radicalization, and Algorithmic Censorship 55 Job Replacement 60 Systemic Problems Aggravated by AI 61 Environmental Degradation 61 Exploitation of Labor 62 Market Concentration 63 Understanding the Causes of AI Risks and Harms 64 Data Bias 64 Limitations of Algorithms 66 Human Decisions 68 Demographic Uniformity in the Technology Industry 70 Conclusion 71 4 Technical Solutions to AI Risks and Harms 73 Technical Solutions: Proponents and Critics 74 Proposed Technical Solutions 76 AI for Social Good 76 Human-in-the-Loop Solutions 79 De-Biasing 80 AI-Generated Text, Image, and Voice Detection 81 Testing 83 Assessing What Technical Solutions Can or Cannot Do 84 Conclusion 87 5 AI Ethics as Business Self-Regulation: Corporate Principles, Boards, Councils, and Teams 90 Business Interest Alignment with Ethical AI Principles 92
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Contents vii Implementing Ethical Business Principles: Advisory Bodies and Responsible Technology Teams 96 Axon’s AI Ethics Board and Ethics and Equity Advisory Council 98 Google and DeepMind: Ethics and Society Research Group, and Institutional Review Board 99 Meta: Oversight Board, Responsible Innovation Team, and Responsible AI Team 103 Microsoft: AI, Ethics and Effects in Engineering and Research (Aether) Committee, Fairness, Accountability, Transparency & Ethics in AI (FATE), Office of Responsible AI Ethics & Society Team 107 The Partnership on AI to Benefit People and Society (Partnership on AI, PAI) 110 Twitter: Trust and Safety Council 111 Conclusion 111 6 Governing AI with Laws and Policies 114 Regulating AI through Law: What Is at Stake? 115 The State of Legal AI Regulation 117 AI Laws and Bills around the World 118 Addressing AI Risks and Harms through Laws and Bills 124 Bias and Discrimination 124 Surveillance 125 Incorrect, Inaccurate, and Unreliable Output 126 Disinformation, Misinformation, or Manipulation 127 Harm to Life, Livelihood, and Well-Being 129 Privacy Violations 129 Decline in Product and Service Quality 132 Political Polarization, Online Radicalization, and Algorithmic Censorship 133 Job Replacement 133 Environmental Degradation 133 Exploitation of Labor 134 Market Concentration 134 Regulatory Tools to Address AI Risks and Harms 135 Penalties and Fines 135 Impact and Conformity Assessment 136 Transparency Requirements 137 Post-deployment Monitoring, Documentation, and Reporting 138 Stakeholder Engagement 139 Regulatory Agencies 139 Business Incentives and Technical Solutions 140 Conclusion 140
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viii Contents 7 Another Way to Govern AI: A Radical-Democratic Vision 143 Technology, Domination, and the Loss of Purpose 145 Disempowerment and Alienation in the Face of AI 149 Misalignment between the Profit Motive and Human Interests 150 Market Concentration 151 AI as an Expert Field 152 Research and Development Gaps 153 Undemocratic Workplace and Unequal Social Relations 154 Making the Case for Politics: Technology, Action, and Creativity 155 Radical Democracy in the Age of AI 157 What Is Radical Democracy? 157 What Radical Democracy Should Look Like in the Age of AI 159 Conclusion 161 Prologue: What Is to Be Done? 164 Best Practices for AI Governance Models 166 Beyond AI Governance Models 167 Five Strategies to Shape the Future of AI 168 Organize 168 Learn 169 Participate 170 Care 170 Resist 171 Conclusion 172 Bibliography 173 Index 187
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ix Matt Gallaway is an amazingly quick, thorough, and encouraging editor. Thank you for everything, Matt. I would like to thank Stephen Ceccoli, Robin Jacobson, Maroussia Lévesque, Amit Ron, Amy Semet, the participants of the Value and Responsibility in AI Technologies Conference at Gonzaga University (April 3–4, 2025), and the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this book’s chapters. I would also like to thank Sarah Cate, Mark Chinen, Julie Homchick Crowe, Pejman Khadivi, Erik Moore, Juan Carlos Reyes, Sara-Jo Swiatek, and Dongsheng Zang for their feedback on earlier versions of this book. Special thanks to Maggie Chon and Nate Kremer-Herman, who gave this book the most meticulous and rich read-through imaginable. I have benefited from many conversations with Caitlin Carlson Ring, Jeffery Smith, and Randy Souza over the years, for which I am grateful. I would like to thank Sevdiye Bakıner, Kemal Bakıner, Egenur Bakıner Yücebilgiç, Çağlar Yücebilgiç, Alp Yücebilgiç, Eylem Sönmez, Ays ̧e Kurs ̧un, and Maya Alev for giving me love and support through the years. Hep aklımdasınız. This book is dedicated to my wife Ece. Iẏi ki varsın. Acknowledgments
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1 Introduction Thinking Outside and Inside the Box to Govern AI Artificial intelligence (AI) will cure cancer. AI will destroy humanity. AI is the ichor of humanoid robots. AI is Big Data. AI is the new oil, the new electricity, the new Industrial Revolution, the new atomic bomb. AI is like tobacco. AI is like junk food. AI is a parrot.1 AI is a mirror.2 AI is marketing hype – snake oil.3 I am sure you have read or heard these statements about AI.4 Depending on which opinion leader you follow, you might think that it is the most transformative technology of our times, a hyped-up technology that has not given humanity reliably useful products yet, or something in between. In popular imagination, AI is at once magical and dangerous. Crowd-pleasing movies portray it as a soulless destroyer (The Terminator), a soulless seducer (Her), or a misunderstood, curious humanoid on the verge of developing consciousness – and, who knows, a soul (Atlas). Novels like Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun and Ian McEwan’s Machines Like Me interrogate what it means to be human when machine intelligence is so close to our minds, hearts, and perhaps supermarket shelves. Documentaries like Coded Bias and The Social Dilemma take issue with the social ills associated with software and platforms powered by algorithms. It seems like we are at the precipice of something great if we get AI right. And if not … well. This book is about efforts to get AI right. Building upon AI scholarship in science and technology studies, technology law, business ethics, and computer science, it documents potential risks and actual harms associated with AI, lists proposed solu- tions to AI-related problems around the world, and assesses their impact. This book presents as many theoretical debates and as much empirical evidence as possible to 1 Bender et al., “On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots.” 2 Vallor, The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim Our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking. 3 Narayanan and Kapoor, AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can’t, and How to Tell the Difference. 4 A note on term usage: Throughout this book, AI refers to the underlying science and technology. Qualifiers, such as generative or symbolic, are used where appropriate. AI tools are software, services, or platforms available to customers. AI systems denote the combination of hardware and software sys- tems with AI and non-AI components. Specific definitions are provided in Chapter 1.
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2 Introduction document how and how well technical solutions, business self-regulation, and legal regulation, which stand out as AI governance toolkits, work. Governance refers to coordinating and steering a society with a multiactor, mul- tilevel, and networked framework.5 Whereas standard theories of government focus on the state as the organized actor ruling over society, governance models argue that international organizations, nation-states, local governments, businesses, and non- governmental organizations coordinate and decide in harmony. Thus, governance acknowledges multiple levels of jurisdiction and a networked decision-making pro- cess rather than top-down decision-making by government.6 AI governance is about collective decisions about people, and the artifacts they develop and use with an AI component.7 Such decisions come from businesses developing and using AI sys- tems, regional, national, and subnational governments and, to a lesser extent, inter- national bodies. As it will become obvious, AI governance has not emerged as a result of conscious coordination by multiple actors; to the contrary, a combination of technical fixes, business practices, and government regulation has coalesced in an unplanned and imperfect way. Throughout this book, AI governance is used as a descriptive, not normative, term. In other words, governance does not a priori mean that the technical, business, and government solutions to AI risks and harms are always useful and effective. Rather, the objective in this book is to hold this gover- nance model to critical scrutiny. AI can be governed partially through a combination of scientific and techno- logical improvements in accuracy, reliability, safety, data protection, and fairness; in-house or external boards, councils, and teams that oversee adherence to ethical business principles in the AI sector; laws and policies regulating AI products (e.g., chatbots and automated decision-making software) and techniques (e.g., deep learn- ing and generative AI) specifically; and laws and policies addressing issues adjacent, but not exclusive, to AI, such as data privacy, data protection, antitrust, and content moderation. In the ideal scenario, technical solutions propel AI models and res- ulting products to successful implementation of ethical norms, while self-regulatory bodies commit businesses to ethical conduct, and laws and policies set binding parameters around private-sector practices to ensure respect for fundamental rights. This idealized governance scheme is likely to produce some desirable results in part because AI-centric and AI-relevant laws and policies build upon established legal systems with a history of regulating the negative impact of scientific and technologi- cal developments, and in part because business incentives are at times aligned with the deployment of accurate, reliable, safe, and fair AI products. 5 Bevir, The SAGE Handbook of Governance; Rhodes, “The New Governance: Governing without Government.” 6 Kooiman, “Social-Political Governance: Overview, Reflections and Design.” 7 For recent scholarship on AI governance, see: Bullock et al., The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance (Oxford Handbooks); Batool, Zowghi, and Bano, “AI Governance”; Veale, Matus, and Gorwa, “AI and Global Governance: Modalities, Rationales, Tensions.”
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Introduction 3 The idealized governance model will not work seamlessly, however. Each compo- nent of this governance scheme has weaknesses – some more than others. Technical solutions are often found in proof-of-concept papers, with little evidence of business adoption. Even when they are implemented, there is no evidence that they offset the magnitude of the problems they claim to address. Ethical AI boards, councils and teams, at arm’s length from the core money-making endeavors they oversee, have been fighting for relevance and impact, if not survival, since their origins in the mid- 2010s. In other words, technical solutions and business self-regulation have limited leverage vis-à-vis the business incentives, models, and practices they want to reform. Disciplining businesses through binding laws and policies remains an untapped potential: There are numerous bills but few actual laws regulating AI. Legal regu- lation is not without its shortcomings, though. Lawmakers in major AI-producing countries are all too happy to seek advice from the same corporations they are sup- posed to regulate; thus, the risk of what legal scholars call “regulatory capture” by industry is all too real. The systemic negative impact of AI on the environment, workers’ rights, and market competition has received almost no legal attention. Furthermore, some of the worst risks of AI – for example, lethal autonomous weap- ons systems – keep concerned activists, journalists, academics, and international lawyers up at night, but politicians have averted serious regulatory proposals in national or international law. The shortcomings of techno-solutionism, business self-regulation, and legal regu- lation are only part of the story. Getting AI governance right cannot be disentangled from local and global struggles for justice and equality. A racist society cannot but develop racist AI. A sexist society cannot but develop sexist AI. A society in which a significant part of the population denies basic facts and scientific findings cannot get content moderation right. A society in which technological progress empowers only a small number of corporations – and a few startups in their orbit – cannot build fair AI. Critical decisions around AI governance (e.g., decisions on what constitutes hate speech, who deserves to be hired, what to do when an algorithm flags the wrong person for arrest, or even what is true and what is false) are almost entirely made by the companies developing AI products or government and private-sector actors using them. The people who are negatively affected by those decisions are denied a seat at the table. It is true that AI creates new problems and amplifies existing ones, but deep down, where AI fails is where human societies fail. Data-driven, machine learning-based AI was born into a planet facing an eco- logical crisis, declining trust in political institutions and severely challenged infor- mation ecosystems in democracies, not to mention deepening national and global inequality. Most people, including citizens of technologically advanced countries, feel alienated from the decisions shaping their lives. The gap between citizens and the politicians who are supposed to represent them is widening. At any rate, a small number of unelected corporate leaders have been making decisions that shape peo- ple’s lives as much as, if not more than, governments. People enjoy the convenience
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4 Introduction and fun brought by contemporary technologies but cannot stop asking why sup- posedly transformative technologies come with a baggage of bias, discrimination, surveillance, disappearance of data privacy, disinformation, rumors of massive unemployment, and the specter of even more inhumane warfare than ever before. That is why this book is a call to think inside and outside the box. Pragmatically, existing AI governance models are too important not to advocate for. Technical solutions, business self-regulation, and – especially – legal regulation can mitigate and even eliminate some of the potential risks and actual harms arising from the development and use of AI, and no other short-term solution is realistic. However, the long-term health of the relationship between technology and society depends on whether ordinary people are empowered to participate in making informed deci- sions to govern the future of technology – AI included. Put simply, the problem is disempowerment and alienation, and the solution is people’s informed participation. Reflecting on decades-long critical discussions on modern technology, I argue that the development of today’s AI is at once a cause and consequence of most peo- ple’s disempowerment and alienation. Academic and journalistic evidence of AI risks and harms refutes the naïve assumption that all technologies benefit everyone without qualifiers. Misalignment between the profit motive and human interests, the presentation of artificial intelligence as an expert field, the market concentration of a few companies, research and development gaps that threaten to deepen access inequality within and across countries and the hierarchies of the capitalist workplace all contribute to disempowerment and alienation. Politicians and political parties have so far done little to close the gap between the interests of most people and deci- sions made by AI industry leaders. Academia, suffering its own crisis of alienation from the public, faces stiff competition from industry in research infrastructure and recruitment of top talent. Nongovernmental organizations, academics, journalists and a few politicians advocating for the defense of rights in the context of techno- logical change appear to be the only actors bringing ordinary people’s struggles to public debates, but their economic and political power is limited. Anyone interested in the development of AI as a technology in the service of the common good, in whatever way defined, should therefore take the call for the expansion of citizens’ agency in making collective decisions seriously. The techni- cal intricacies involved in technological decision-making cannot be ignored, but the academic and journalistic evidence compiled in this book leaves no doubt that decisions that go into the research, design, development, deployment, and use of AI are about the distribution of benefits and risks among people – in a word, politics. Thus, I argue that everyone has an interest in, and skills for, shaping the future of AI. This analysis of technical, corporate, and legal governance should acknowledge the true heroes in this story: Journalists, researchers, social movement activists, whis- tleblowers, lawyers, conscientious corporate workers, and (a few) politicians who have raised awareness around AI risks and harms. Every single case of course correc- tion described in this book was made possible thanks to someone who sounded the
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Data and Methods 5 alarm after meticulous research on an AI system that affected someone negatively. Without them, we would have lived in a world of illusions in which we would accept without evidence that every technological product is good and anyone rais- ing objections is a hopeless technophobe. I believe AI can still be reimagined and developed as a technology that serves humanity while causing minimal or no harm. Humans can live in harmony with technology. It requires a robust governance model that leverages technical, busi- ness, and government solutions to detect and mitigate risks and harms. A genuinely successful governance model that goes beyond avoiding the worst harms to actu- ally reconstruct AI as a public good necessitates a radical rethink of technology, and through it, society. Citizens cannot allow themselves to be passive recipients of technology in the age of AI. We need to reclaim our agency to build a better world. Data and Methods This book draws upon a study of online media archives, which cover (1) newspapers (e.g., The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Boston Globe, The Globe and Mail, The Guardian, The Economic Times), (2) technology magazines (e.g., Wired, TechCrunch, MIT Technology Review); (3) online technology blogs; (4) academic publications in the social sciences and humanities, law, journalism, and computer science; and (5) company blogs and reports. News articles about the following are selected: • AI and AI-related concepts, such as machine learning, deep learning, algo- rithms, automated decision-making systems, and generative AI; • Potential risks and concrete harms arising from AI, such as bias and dis- crimination, disinformation, surveillance, data privacy violations, and labor exploitation; • Terms associated with socially desirable AI, such as accuracy, ethics, fairness, responsibility, safety, and transparency; • Proposed technological solutions, such as AI for social good, de-biasing, AI detection, and red-teaming; • Business oversight boards, councils, and teams, such as Meta’s Oversight Board and Microsoft’s Responsible AI Council; • Bills and laws that aim to regulate AI or AI-related concerns, such as privacy and consumer protection, around the world; and • Opinion pieces that offer a bird’s-eye view of the relationship between AI and society. The collected information is analyzed using quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The quantitative analysis relies on a comparison of term counts over time (e.g., the use of AI ethics over time), term co-occurrences (e.g., de-biasing used in the same sentence as discrimination) and in comparison to similar terms (e.g., AI
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6 Introduction ethics vs. responsible AI). These comparisons present a picture of the evolution of ideas and practices around AI governance. The qualitative component of analy- sis identifies common patterns, themes, and meanings, and instances of scholarly agreement and disagreement across texts. Every piece of academic and journalistic evidence that a proposed solution has worked or failed is documented, and analyzed in light of available information. If the explanation for an event or decision has gen- erated disagreement among academics, journalists, social movements and industry spokespersons, multiple evidence-based viewpoints are reported. Book Outline Chapter 1 introduces basic terminology. Terms such as artificial intelligence; data; algorithm; machine learning; neural networks; deep learning; large language models; generative AI and symbolic AI are presented to develop a sense of what AI is, how it has evolved and what it does. This chapter also introduces some of the major con- ceptual disagreements in the field. Different ideas about how to develop AI in the best way drive disagreements, as well as philosophical differences over what intelli- gence means and whether machines can develop human-like intelligence. Chapter 2 is devoted to AI ethics, broadly defined. It provides an overview of ethi- cal; responsible; safe; trustworthy; transparent and explainable; accurate; just and fair; accountable; sustainable; robust; accessible and inclusive AI. Just as the definition of AI itself is fraught with disagreement, words with a connotation of “good” AI have generated considerable controversy among academics, social movement activists, journalists, business leaders, and lawmakers. This chapter aims to represent the plu- rality of positions. Furthermore, the adjectives associated with getting AI right are mutually supportive, but tensions between desirable goals are mentioned as well. Chapter 3 presents the other side of the coin, namely AI risks and harms. Automated decision systems, chatbots, recommender systems and other AI-powered software and platforms have been found to cause potential risks or actual harms to affected per- sons and communities. Such risks and harms include bias and discrimination; sur- veillance; inaccurate, incorrect, and unreliable output; disinformation, misinformation, or manipulation; harm to life, livelihood and wellbeing; privacy violations; decline in product and service quality; political polarization, online radicalization and algorith- mic censorship; and job replacement. Some of these harms, like bias and discrimina- tion, have already been experienced frequently, while others, like job replacement, point to future risks. It is also worth noting that AI risks and harms often aggravate existing social and political problems. For example, political polarization and radical- ization, while exacerbated by algorithmic curation, appear to have origins in societal divisions. Finally, AI is criticized for causing system-level harm in the form of environ- mental degradation; exploitation of labor; and market concentration. Chapter 4 is devoted to technical solutions to rectify AI risks and harms. AI for social good projects; human-in-the-loop solutions; de-biasing; AI-generated text, image
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Book Outline 7 and voice detection; and testing are presented as potential technical fixes. Detecting AI-generated content remains a major challenge. Human-in-the-loop solutions and testing have proven to be such commonsense practices that they are promoted by AI-producing or -using businesses themselves as well as by laws. AI for social good projects and de-biasing produce positive impact, but there seems to be a gap between expectations and reality. As is documented throughout this book, the roots of AI risks and harms are not technical; therefore, technical solutions cannot bring about transformative change in the face of AI risks and harms. Chapter 5 addresses business self-regulation as an AI governance model. Voluntary AI principles and codes of conduct have risen to prominence in the absence of AI laws since the mid-2010s. Numerous large companies have established internal or external advisory boards or councils and responsible AI teams to hold themselves accountable. The evidence on these self-regulatory bodies is mixed: Journalistic reports suggest improvements in business conduct in a number of cases, but one cannot ignore the fact that none of the boards, councils, or teams can force busi- nesses to respect their decisions or suggestions. What is worse, some powerful AI companies have ignored calls to create self-regulatory institutions or disbanded them at first sight of friction. Chapter 6 is about laws as binding mechanisms to eliminate or mitigate AI risks and harms. Most countries have AI-promotion strategies that devote little or no attention to potential problems. The number of bills proposed in national legisla- tures to address those problems has been increasing since the late 2010s, but only the European Union and South Korea have thus far legislated laws regulating AI. Despite the absence of AI-centric lawmaking, however, some trends are emerging. First, AI regulation has been taking place, to a limited extent, in AI-adjacent realms such as data privacy and protection, consumer rights, antitrust, and children’s pro- tection. Second, the European Union’s AI Act has set the trend for risk-based, future-proof, and technology-neutral legislation that will likely be followed by other countries. Third, the absence of national legislation in the United States, home to most cutting-edge AI technologies from the 1990s to the early 2020s, has led states and cities to take initiative. And finally, even the successful passage of a law does not address all AI risks and harms – lawmakers’ omission of military AI as an area of regulation is a case in point. Chapter 7 zooms out of conceptual and empirical studies of AI governance to ask if we can build a better future with AI. The technical, corporate, and legal gover- nance models presented in this book are necessary but insufficient to endow ordinary people with the power to push back against risks and harms, and chart a course for AI for the common good. Thinking together with philosophers and social scientists in the Critical Theory, Science and Technology Studies, and Democratic Theory traditions, I argue that most people’s experience with AI is one of fear as a result of their long-standing disempowerment and alienation from the technologies shaping their lives. Attributing disempowerment and alienation to technical aspects of AI
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8 Introduction is wrongheaded: It is the evolution of modern capitalism that has widened the gap between people and the technologies that are supposed to make their lives better. Reorienting the relationship between people and AI requires a radical-democratic politics that questions hierarchy in government and in the workplace. Technology can serve as a force for the social good only if informed citizens participate in the decisions shaping their lives in the design, development, deployment, and use of modern technology, AI included. The prologue fleshes out the lessons drawn from this book. It offers best practices for a workable AI governance model that uses technical solutions, business self- regulation and legal regulation. Then, it delves into some of the shortcomings of that model. The radical-democratic perspective I advocate makes five general, prac- tical suggestions for everyone concerned with AI risks and harms. (1) Organize: Build networks of support and civic organizations around technology-specific concerns as well as conventional rights considerations; (2) Learn: Acquire cross-disciplinary capabilities on the uses, practical applications, potential risks, and governance models associated with technologies like AI; (3) Participate: Push politicians and businesses to expand the boundaries of decision-making in the public and private sectors; (4) Care: Approach technological change from the perspective of vulnerable populations, and with an ethic of non-domination that refuses to treat nature and other people as instruments; and (5) Resist: Maintain an openness to contention with the producers and users of technologies that generate risks and harms.
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9 1 What’s in an Abbreviation? Defining and Understanding AI The term artificial intelligence (AI) was first used by mathematician, computer sci- entist, and cognitive scientist John McCarthy in his letter of application to con- duct a workshop on machine simulation of intelligence funded by the Rockefeller Institute in 1955.1 The attribution of intelligence was in reference to getting comput- ers to accurately, quickly, and efficiently complete tasks generally associated with human logical, mathematical, strategic, and sensory capabilities. McCarthy’s appli- cation, which culminated in the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence of 1956, is often portrayed as a founding moment in AI research. Interestingly, McCarthy coined the term as a placeholder. He did not mean the term to invite direct mind–machine comparisons; he simply wanted to avoid the conceptual baggage accompanying similar terms at the time, like automata and cybernetics.2 Despite the term’s humble origins, a machine’s ability to mimic human cogni- tive behavior has captured the imagination of generations of AI researchers. AI is deceptively hard to define. This chapter offers a conceptual background on AI and AI-related terms to set the context for the rest of this book. What is more, defin- itions demystify: The science of AI is admittedly complex, but its underlying intui- tion should be made understandable to lay audiences. Portraying it as some kind of magic is not only scientifically wrong but also serves to give undue power to a small group of AI developers and the companies employing them. This short chapter is structured as follows: “Defining Artificial Intelligence and Related Terminology” offers nontechnical definitions for AI, data, algorithms, machine learning (ML), neural networks, deep learning, large language models (LLMs), generative AI, and symbolic AI – leading concepts in the contemporary AI discourse. Closely related technical terms, such as supervised learning, unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning, hidden layers, weights, attention, self-attention, 1 Ball, The Book of Minds: How to Understand Ourselves and Other Beings, from Animals to AI to Aliens: 276. 2 Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements: 78.
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