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The Psychology of Cybersecurity This book takes a fresh look at the underappreciated role of human psychology in cybersecurity and information technology management. It discusses the latest insights from practice and scholarly work on the role of cognitive bias and human factors in critical decisions that could affect the lives of many people. Written by an experienced chief information security officer (CISO) and an aca‑ demic with over two decades of lived experience dealing with cybersecurity risks, this book considers the psychological drivers and pitfalls of the four key personas in cybersecurity – from hackers and defenders, to targeted individuals and organi‑ sational leaders. It bridges state‑of‑the‑art research findings with real‑world ex‑ amples and case studies to show how understanding the psychological factors in cybersecurity can help people protect themselves and their organisations better. Full of advice on security best practices that consider the human element of cybersecurity, this book will be of great interest to professionals and managers in the cybersecurity domain, information technology, and governance and risk man‑ agement. It will also be relevant to students and those aspiring to grow in this field. Tarnveer Singh is an award‑winning Chief Information Security Officer with dec‑ ades of security experience across a wide range of sectors. He is Director (Security and Compliance) at Cyber Wisdom Ltd, an Information Security and Compliance Consultancy, helping clients to address security threats affecting their business. He is also a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Information Security and a Chartered IT Professional with the British Computer Society. Sarah Y. Zheng, PhD, is a neuropsychologist investigating emerging crime and security risks from technological advances. Through her research, she helps or‑ ganisations become more resilient to phishing attacks and improve people’s aware‑ ness of new (cyber)security threats. Before returning to academia, she developed AI applications and worked in data science for financial, retail, and government institutes. With her unique understanding of both people and technology, her mis‑ sion is to protect the human element in technology.
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Current Issues in Cyberpsychology brings together books that explore the psychol‑ ogy behind human interaction with digital technology, and the impact of the inter‑ net on individuals and society as a whole. It showcases books that will be relevant to both an academic and professional market, bringing together the work of established and emerging authors. The series spans a range of topics relating to cyberpsychology; including the influence of technology on behaviour and attitudes, the effects of social media, human factors in cybersecurity, and digital identities. Ideas for new books are welcome. For more information about the series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ our‑products/book‑series/CIIC The Psychology of Cybersecurity Hacking and the Human Mind Tarnveer Singh and Sarah Y. Zheng Current Issues in Cyberpsychology
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The Psychology of Cybersecurity Hacking and the Human Mind Tarnveer Singh and Sarah Y. Zheng
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Designed cover image: Getty © Pobytov First published 2026 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2026 Tarnveer Singh and Sarah Y. Zheng The right of Tarnveer Singh and Sarah Y. Zheng to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing‑in‑Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781041005711 (hbk) ISBN: 9781041005704 (pbk) ISBN: 9781003610533 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003610533 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra
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Contents Foreword ix PART 1 Enter the world of cybercrime 1 1 Most cybercriminals are made, not born 3 2 Hackers: the good, the bad, and the ugly 8 Hacktivism 10 Once a hacker, always a hacker? 11 Notorious hackers 12 Interviews with real‑life cybercriminals 18 3 How an attack is devised 35 Selecting targets 35 Skills that make attacks succeed 36 Social engineering attacks: hacking people’s minds 37 Ransomware attacks 40 Exploiting misconfigurations 42 4 Special cases 45 Insider threats 45 The impact of insider threats 49 Whistleblowers 49 Third party and supply chain risks 56 Impact of cyber‑attacks on trust 68
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vi Contents PART 2 Inside the line of defence 71 5 Operational cybersecurity context 73 Pressures of the job 73 Cybersecurity needs diversity 75 Why work in cybersecurity 76 6 Human fallacies and how to overcome them 79 Biases affecting threat analysis 79 Biases affecting risk management 81 7 Operational resilience 85 People 86 Processes 86 Technology 90 Business continuity 91 8 Organisational psychology 94 9 Improving organisational cybersecurity 97 Good governance 98 Better training and education 102 Security by design 105 Organisational cybersecurity culture 106 Cybersecurity champions 108 Nudge programmes 110 Situational crime prevention 111 PART 3 The target’s perspective 115 10 Psychology applied in cybersecurity 117 Opening the black box 117 Brains: natural prediction machines 120 11 How we take the bait 125 Technical people have human brains too 128 Know yourself to protect yourself 129
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Contents vii PART 4 The Psychology of a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 133 12 Responsibilities of a CISO 135 The SECCRRT to effective CISOs 136 Leading the psychology and cybersecurity integration 138 Shaping the organisation’s psychological security posture 140 Behavioural profiling 141 Getting security buy‑in across the board 143 13 Psychological toll on CISOs 146 Managing risk 146 Managing the executive team 152 Overcoming stress and building resilience 155 14 Concluding remarks 158 Glossary 163 Index 165
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Foreword In 2023, Microsoft customers around the globe received over 600 million cyber‑at‑ tacks each day [1]. It is no surprise, then, hardly a week goes by without a security breach somewhere. Just in the UK, over 700,000 businesses reported having expe‑ rienced a cybersecurity breach or attack in 2023, where a breach cost an average of £10,830 to medium and large businesses [2]. These incidents undermine people’s trust in organisations, institutions, and governments. Thus, with the continuous developments in engineering and computing technology, the world is set for the cy‑ bersecurity field to take centre stage – or, at least, be the essential backbone thereof. Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting computer systems, networks, and sensitive information from unauthorised access, theft, or damage. It ensures the safety and integrity of our digital world. As two experts in this field, we are closely observing how the cybersecurity landscape is evolving. One of us has been imple‑ menting cybersecurity in various organisations as a CISO for over 20 years. The other has been researching human behaviour for over a decade and has a doctorate degree on (not in!) social engineering attacks. Digital technologies are increasingly permeating every area of modern life indeed, with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT) creating new vulner‑ abilities that cybercriminals can exploit. And while innovation is exciting in its own right, at the end of the day, cybersecurity is about people protecting people. They are the only stable factor in this otherwise whack‑a‑mole field. We therefore must understand the psychology behind cyber‑attacks and how it affects lines of defence, to allow people to develop better strategies to protect themselves from these threats. In a way, it does not matter if criminals are breaking into buildings or breaking into computer systems. We named the former burglary, the latter hacking. The tools to execute either have changed, but the objectives remain the same. Offenders will be out there to intercept things of value, from jewellery to intellectual property and personal data, and wreak havoc. Our job as cybersecurity professionals is to prevent cyber offenders from achieving such goals. This has typically been done through deep technical expertise about computer systems, which led to numerous risk and compliance policies, security frameworks, and certification programmes like OWASP, CISSP, and SSCP.
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x Foreword What we are seeing now, especially with the rise of sophisticated AI technolo‑ gies, is that focusing on technical expertise is no longer enough. Hackers are be‑ coming more apt at using psychological tactics in their attacks, exploiting new vulnerabilities with AI and the IoT. As cybersecurity professionals, we therefore must study the psychological factors in cyber‑attacks to develop effective coun‑ termeasures, and improve people’s overall safety and security. Similarly, organisa‑ tions need to leverage psychological strategies to enhance their cyber defences. This involves understanding what motivates cybercriminals and how they think, why people are often called the “weakest link” in the security chain, the contextual effects of cybersecurity on operational decision‑making and methods to effectively encourage individuals to embrace secure practices. People play a significant role in cybersecurity, because a significant proportion of cybersecurity incidents is caused by human error – when we overlooked some‑ thing or wrongly discarded a possible explanation for an event. Even with the most sophisticated security technology and protocols, individuals who are not educated or trained inadequately can still (unknowingly) compromise their own or their or‑ ganisation’s security. For example, cyber‑attackers often use social engineering tactics, such as phishing e‑mails and phone scams, to trick people into revealing sensitive information or performing other insecure actions. If people are not aware of these tactics and do not know how to identify or avoid them, they can inadvert‑ ently expose themselves or their organisations to further attacks. Moreover, people may unwittingly give away sensitive information on social media, (re)use weak passwords and unintentionally download untrustworthy software. At the same time, if security protocols are too complicated or difficult to use, employees will try to circumvent them. Or, if they are too easy to use, they may not provide adequate protection. Similarly, security awareness training that is not engaging may not properly prepare employees to identify and respond to cyber threats. We therefore turn to the field of cyberpsychology to examine how technol‑ ogy affects human behaviour. In other words, how people interact with information technology systems, and how this impacts our thoughts, feelings, and actions. As we all interact more and more through computer technologies in our day‑to‑day lives, we have to keep the human in the loop to improve cybersecurity. Indeed, as technology continues to advance, the field of cyberpsychology will be‑ come increasingly important in the fight against hacking attempts. A technically elegant cyber defence system simply becomes moot if people are not given usable tools, training and cybersecurity programmes to keep their organisations secure. Various elements influence how securely people behave, such as their awareness and risk perception, the significance of the data and assets being safeguarded, and the time and resource investments required for implementing security measures. CISOs are uniquely positioned in this landscape, as they need to address human errors in cybersecurity, develop strategies for mitigating human fallacies, advocate the need for a human‑centred approach, and provide training and education to re‑ duce human error. This includes addressing the under‑researched cognitive biases in system administrators, software developers and cybersecurity domain experts. Thus, just as attackers take advantage of human psychology, the cybersecurity
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Foreword xi industry must also understand human behaviour when developing security systems and training, and how to communicate with general computer users. Equipped with numerous case studies of real‑world security breaches, and state‑of‑the‑art crime and cybersecurity research, this book will take you on a jour‑ ney through the minds of those conceiving cyber‑attacks, people working to defend their organisations, attack targets and the CISO. We structured this book into four corresponding parts that will give you a solid, foundational understanding of the psychological factors that make the key personas in cybersecurity. We will use this knowledge to provide practical advice, and show how cybersecurity could be made more usable and therewith more effective. Through this journey, we will see that cybersecurity is, indeed, a sociotechnical field, where “people knowledge” can often be more important than technological expertise. With this, we aim to inspire you to incorporate human‑in‑the‑loop thinking in your own cybersecurity approach and make this world a safer place. References 1 Microsoft, “Microsoft digital defense report 2024,” 2024. Available: https://www. microsoft.com/en‑us/security/security‑insider/intelligence‑reports/microsoft‑digital‑ defense‑report‑2024 2 Department of Science, Innovation & Technology, “Cyber security breaches survey 2024,” 2024. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber‑security‑breaches‑ survey‑2024/cyber‑security‑breaches‑survey‑2024#summary
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Part 1 Enter the world of cybercrime
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003610533-2 Most crime, including cybercrime, does not happen by accident [1]. It consists of carefully deliberated manoeuvres aimed at serving a personal desire. Seeing cyber‑attacks as crime allows us to apply the knowledge gathered over many years from criminology and crime science on understanding why and how people com‑ mit criminal offences. It lets us think like an attacker and see what factors facilitate or hamper the execution of an attack. Ultimately, this will help us create better deterrents and response mechanisms to improve cybersecurity. In this chapter, we will introduce a fundamental crime science theory to ex‑ plain what makes someone choose to commit (cyber)crime. Chapter 2: Hackers: the good, the bad and the ugly will detail what drives different types of hack‑ ers and how their lives may evolve, using real‑life examples. Chapter 3: How an attack is devised then describes how they carry out various attack types. Lastly, in Chapter 4: Special cases, we describe cybersecurity threats from special case offenders – whistle‑blowers, insider threats, and third parties. Let us first define what we mean by cybercrime and see how cyber‑attacks fit with that definition. The European Commission (EC) defines three broad types of cybercrime: (1) Internet‑specific crimes, such as phishing attacks, (2) Online fraud and forgery, such as identity theft and selling fake products, and (3) Illegal online content, such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and incitement or glorifica‑ tion of hatred and terrorism, for example, via social media and on the dark web [2]. The EC’s definitions roughly correspond with “Cyber‑Dependent Crimes”, “Economic Related Cybercrime”, and “Cyber‑Enabled Crime”, respectively, as de‑ fined in the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service guidance on prosecuting cybercrime [3]. Although people often associate cybersecurity with preventing cyber‑attacks (i.e., internet‑specific or cyber‑dependent crime), it is worth briefly reflecting on cybersecurity in the broader sense. Fundamental cybersecurity measures such as authentication and identification are implied in all cybercrime – to find out who is behind creating and uploading scams, fake ads, fake LinkedIn profiles, CSAM, fake news, or disseminating extremist sentiments. However, for the purpose of this book, we will focus on cybersecurity in relation to internet‑specific crimes. An activity typically becomes a crime when it intentionally causes signifi‑ cant harm to others, either directly (e.g., in the case of violence and abuse) or by undermining systems (e.g., in the case of corruption and money laundering). 1 Most cybercriminals are made, not born
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4 The Psychology of Cybersecurity Figure 1.1 Crime triangles. Launching cyber‑attacks to break (into) computer systems (i.e., hacking) can have devastating impacts on people and systems – and, naturally, is illegal when done for nefarious purposes [3]. Even seemingly inconsequential cyber‑attacks can levy tremendous damage by traumatising individuals, undermining societal cohesion, and exacerbating pre‑existing cycles of violence. They can cause significant psy‑ chological harm, equal even to that caused by conventional political violence and terrorism. In fact, malicious hacks into national critical infrastructure and obtaining large‑scale volumes of sensitive data could be regarded as cyber terrorism and thus warrant heavy‑handed counterterrorism measures against hacking [4]. Now you might wonder, why would anyone turn into a criminal hacker? What motivates them? There is no single answer to this question, as hackers are also people motivated by different things – but it is clear someone needs to have a rea‑ son to commit a crime [5]. Although most hackers may primarily be motivated by financial gain, others may mostly be motivated by the challenge of breaking into a system, as we will see in the following chapters. Some may be motivated by a desire to expose vulnerabilities in a system, and yet others use it to protest against a particular company or political ideology. Regardless of their underlying motivation, cyber‑attacks all serve the same goal: to access information systems not meant for them, which they can then exploit for financial and/or political reasons. This can include personal information like credit card details, social security numbers, or medical records, as well as sensitive gov‑ ernment information and intellectual property that could be used for blackmail, extortion, or espionage. To really understand what makes a cybercriminal, we need to consider both the psychological and situational factors that facilitate crime. Traditional crime research has shown that crime cannot be explained (solely) by people’s personal dispositions, such as their morality and risk appetite. For a criminal act to happen, there needs to be an opportunity at a specific time and place, where a motivated in‑ dividual can interact with a suitable target [6]. This theory is commonly depicted as the “crime triangle”, shown on the left in Figure 1.1. In short, if the circumstances are right for crime, it will happen – as the wonderful Dutch saying “de gelegenheid maakt de dief” goes.
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Most cybercriminals are made, not born 5 The right triangle in Figure 1.1 shows three psychological elements that further drive someone to become an offender: (1) desire, (2) opportunity, and (3) ability [7]. Someone needs to feel strongly about reaching a specific goal, perceive an opportunity to act on that desire and have the right skills to capitalise on that op‑ portunity. Popular crime series often use similar terms such as “means, motive and opportunity” to help public jurors and viewers judge whether a suspect could indeed be guilty. It may only work in one direction, however. That is, if a person has the desire, opportunity, and ability to commit a crime, it does not automatically make them guilty. What it means is that they will generally be more likely than average to commit an offence that is opportune in their environment. Together, these theories imply that crime can be prevented or at least reduced by blocking just one of the three elements of either triangle. That is, if you take away either someone’s desire, ability or opportunity to commit an offence, or make potential targets and locations much harder to reach, crime will happen less. For example, thwarting opportunities for theft and burglary by introducing better con‑ trols in places known to be prone to these crimes, such as placing surveillance cameras in and around expensive shops [8]. We will elaborate on these situational crime prevention measures in Chapter 9: Improving organisational cybersecurity. When it comes to cyber‑attacks, offenders are often called hackers who target specific computer systems and/or individuals (i.e., the “target/victim” in the crime triangle) through the internet (i.e., the “place”). As the internet is not a heavily reg‑ ulated “place”, and widely available and accessible across the world, hackers and targets could be anywhere and act at any time. In other words, the internet is rife with opportunities for cyber‑attacks. The alarming rise in cybercrime over recent years should thus come as no surprise [9]. In fact, some people argue that for this reason, we should require people to authenticate themselves with an internationally recognised identity to use the internet, so to render anonymous internet use impos‑ sible. It is not a technical question whether this is possible. In many ways, big tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Weixin are already capable of identify‑ ing unique users without necessarily knowing their true, physical identities. The is‑ sue is that even if there were geopolitical will to implement such a system, reaching international agreements on the specific terms and conditions thereof would pose an even bigger challenge in itself – apart from the possibility that in this scenario, unlawful anonymous internets may still be set up and maintained. An alternative future concept of the internet is the setup of an artificial intelligence (AI) adjudi‑ cator that switches users between regional AI‑driven internets that follow local regulations and political values [10]. Still, it is highly questionable whether any of these systems would completely stop hackers and state‑sponsored criminals from committing attacks. There are many types of offenders, depending on their ability, desire, and circum‑ stances. They may be lone actors, part of hacktivist groups, nation‑state‑ sponsored, or even coerced into such role. Certain organised crime groups in Southeast Asia, for example, are known to recruit people for “better economic opportunities” abroad. In reality, they take innocent recruits hostage and force them to commit cybercrime, such as online fraud and social engineering attacks [11]. In those cases,
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6 The Psychology of Cybersecurity not complying with the organisation’s requests typically results in abuse. The only differentiator between these coerced offenders and voluntary cybercriminals then is the desire to stay alive versus a sole desire to get rich quickly, respectively. At the same time, obscure regional technology and intelligence companies may be “legitimately” sponsored by corporations and governments to carry out cyber‑attacks for espionage and meddle with adversarial politics. Examples in‑ clude Russian state‑sponsored disinformation campaigns disseminated to Ameri‑ can social media users [12], the role of Cambridge Analytica in such practices [13], and Israeli intelligence companies skilled at developing spyware [14]. People who work there may have been tempted by attractive salaries and a desire to act on their own political ideology (i.e., “desire”), and secure jobs at renowned, stable organisations (i.e., “opportunity”) that suit their skills set (i.e., “ability”). They carry out or facilitate cyber‑attacks as “legitimate” parts of their job, and can be especially dangerous and difficult to prosecute, as they are protected by their local governments with secure material and financial resources. Then there is a group of lone actors who may work in different (anonymous) constellations for each new “project” (i.e., every next cyber‑attack) that most people probably think of when they hear the word “hacker”. This is a good moment to delve deeper into the circumstances that shape the lives of different types of offenders, starting with the various types of hackers there are today. References 1 G. Laycock, Crime, Science and Policing, 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2023. 2 European Commission, “Cybercrime,” European Commission, Brussels, 2024. 3 Crown Prosecution Service, “Cybercrime ‑ prosecution guidance,” Crown Prosecution Service, London, 2024. 4 N. K. H. O. Ryan Shandler, “Public opinion and cyberterrorism,” Public Opinion Quar- terly, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 92–119, 2023. 5 C. H. Burt and R. L. Simons, “Self‑control, thrill seeking, and crime: Motivation mat‑ ters,” Criminal Justice and Behaviour, vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 1326–1348, 2013. 6 R. V. Clarke, “Situational crime prevention: Theory and practice,” British Journal of Criminology, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 136–147, 1980; R. V. C. Marcus Felson, “Opportunity makes the thief: Practical theory for crime prevention,” Police Research Series, vol. Paper No 98, pp. 1–36, 1998. 7 K. H. Vellani, “Crime analysis for problem solving security professionals in 25 small steps,” Houston, TX: Karim H. Vellani, 2010. Available: https://www.popcenter.org/ library/reading/pdfs/crimeanalysis25steps.pdf 8 D. L. W. John Eck, “Crime places in crime theory,” Crime and Place: Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 4, pp. 1–33, 2015. 9 N. Kshetri, “Positive externality, increasing returns, and the rise in cybercrimes,” Com- munications of the ACM, vol. 52, no. 12, pp. 141–144, 2009; Interpol, “Cybercrime: COVID‑19 impact,” Interpol, Lyon, 2020. 10 Schmidt, Eric, Henry A. Kissinger, and Craig Mundie. Genesis: Artificial Intelligence, Hope, and the Human Spirit. Hachette UK, 2024.
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Most cybercriminals are made, not born 7 11 H. L. A. W. Bryan Tzu Wei Luk, “The thrive of Chinese transnational organized crimes in southeast Asia under OBORization and the COVID‑19 pandemic: The case of Cam‑ bodia and K. K. Park Criminal Hub in Myanmar,” SSRN, 2023. 12 D. Freelon and T. Lokot, “Russian Twitter disinformation campaigns reach across the American political spectrum,” Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 12–23, 2020. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr‑2020‑003; F. Hjorth and R. Adler‑Nissen, “Ideological asymmetry in the reach of pro‑Russian digital disinforma‑ tion to United States audiences,” Journal of Communication, vol. 69, pp. 168–192, 2019. 13 H. Berghel, “Malice domestic: The Cambridge analytica dystopia,” Computer, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 84–89, 2018. 14 H. Shezaf and J. Jacobson, “Revealed: Israel’s cyber‑spy industry helps world dicta‑ tors hunt dissidents and gays,” Haaretz Daily Newspaper, 2018. https://www.haaretz. com/israel‑news/2018‑10‑20/ty‑article‑magazine/.premium/israels‑cyber‑spy‑ industry‑ aids‑dictators‑hunt‑dissidents‑and‑gays/0000017f‑e9a9‑dc91‑a17f‑fdadde240000; War on Want, “Israeli spyware is threatening our rights and freedoms,” 2023. Available: https://waronwant.org/resources/israeli‑spyware‑threatening‑our‑rights‑and‑freedoms; S. Woodhams, Spyware: An Unregulated and Escalating Threat to Independent Me‑ dia. Center for International Media Assistance, 2021; E. Zureik, “Settler colonialism, neoliberalism and cyber surveillance: the case of Israel,” Middle East Critique, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 219–235, 2020.